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DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY v. UNITED STATES AND 
AERIAL SURVEILLANCE BY THE EPA: AN 
ARGUMENT FOR POST-SURVEILLANCE NOTICE TO 
THE OBSERVED 
Stephen C. Bazarian* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
February 7, 1978, was a clear, cold day in Midland, Michigan. On 
that day several members of the Dow Chemical Company (Dow) 
were holding a meeting in a conference room at Dow's Midland plant. 
During the course of the meeting, one of the men present glanced 
out the window and noticed a small plane flying over the factory. 
Because the plane passed over the factory more than once, the man 
became somewhat suspicious of its operations. Slowly, it dawned on 
him that the plane was probably photographing the Dow plant. He 
and several other members present tried to discern the aircraft's 
identification numbers but were unable to do so. Those at the meet-
ing began to wonder who was surveying them and how they could 
do so without informing anyone at the company about the overflight. 1 
With this auspicious start, the Dow Chemical Co. v. United States2 
case began. In 1977, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
wanted to inspect Dow Chemical Company's Midland, Michigan, 
plant to ensure its compliance with the Clean Air Act. 3 The EPA 
* Articles Editor, 1987-88 BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Telephone interview with Jane M. Gootee, Esq., Counsel of Record for The Dow Chern. 
Co. (March 12, 1987) [hereinafter Gootee Interview J. 
2 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986). 
3 This inspection was pursuant to section 114(a) of the Clean Air Act 
(2) the Administrator or his authorized representative, upon presentation of his 
credentials -
(A)shall have a right to entry to, upon, or through any premises of such person or 
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was attempting to gather information concerning smokestack emis-
sions from two of the factory's power plants.4 The Dow plant is a 
2,000 acre complex that consists of a number of covered buildings 
and some uncovered outdoor manufacturing areas. 5 The EPA made 
one on-site inspection of the Dow plant in September of 1977. 6 Dow 
refused, however, to grant the EPA subsequent entry when Dow 
discovered that the EPA intended to take photographs of the plant's 
interior.7 In spite of Dow's refusal and without a search warrant, 
the EPA hired a commercial aerial photographer to take pictures of 
the facility.8 The EPA hoped these photographs would enable them 
to better see the emissions from the stacks, observe the factory's 
layout and judge the effects of the emissions on surrounding plant 
growth. 9 
The EPA's photographer made six passes over the plant at alti-
tudes of 20,000, 3,000, and 1,200 feet.lO The photographs could be 
enlarged to a scale where one inch of a photo was equivalent to 
twenty feet of the plant. ll As a result, numerous details such as 
power lines and equipment as small as one-half inch in diameter 
could be seen without significant distortion. 12 The EPA sent these 
photographs to its Region V enforcement office in Chicago. 13 The 
aerial photographers subsequently informed Dow Chemical Com-
pany that the investigation was conducted for the EPA. 14 
Dow Chemical Company brought an action against the EPA in 
federal court. Dow alleged that the EPA violated the fourth 
in which any records required to be maintained under paragraph (1) of this 
section are located, and 
(B)may at reasonable times have access to and copy any records, inspect any 
monitoring equipment or method required under paragraph (1), and sample 
any emission which such person is required to sample under paragraph (1). 
42 U.S.C. § 7414(a) (1982). 
4 Brief for the United States at 2, Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819 
(1986) (No. 84-1259) [hereinafter United States Brief]. 
5 Dow Chem. Co., 106 S. Ct. at 1820. 
6 Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 310 (6th Cir. 1984), afi'd, 106 S. Ct. 1819 
(1986). 
7Id. 
8Id. at 310. 
9 United States Brief, supra note 4, at 2. 
10Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 7, Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986) 
(No. 84-1259) [hereinafter Reply Brief]. 
13 Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 12, Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819 
(1986) (No. 84-1259) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief]. 
14 Gootee Interview, supra note 1. 
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amendment's15 prohibition against illegal searches and also violated 
the agency's statutory authority under the Clean Air Act. 16 The 
district court ruled in favor of Dow. 17 The court of appeals, though, 
reversed, holding that the EPA's actions did not violate the fourth 
amendment and were within its statutory authority. IS In 1986, the 
Supreme Court held that the EPA's use of aerial surveillance did 
not violate Dow's fourth amendment rights. 19 The Court reached this 
decision by designating the plant, because of its sprawling size and 
make-up, as an "open field"20 which is not an area protected by the 
fourth amendment. 21 
The Dow case presents a conflict of interests. The business owner's 
rights are pitted against the government's need to enforce environ-
mental regulations. The Dow decision aids in the enforcement of 
environmental regulations. However, it does not resolve the sur-
veillance problems for those being observed. The Dow Court limited 
its reasoning to the question of whether the Dow plant was an open 
field;22 it did not, therefore, consider other factors that are important 
in determining whether a manufacturing plant has a recognizable 
right to privacy. These other issues include an evaluation of the 
height of the surveillance, its duration, what methods of observation 
enhancement were involved, and if competitors could have access to 
the information gathered. 
The Court's complete omission of a consideration of these variables 
of aerial surveillance serves to make factory operators, such as Dow, 
vulnerable to a federal agency's investigatory powers without con-
comitant protection of the businesses' privacy interests. The prob-
15 U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV. The fourth amendment reads in full: 
The right of the persons to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched or the person to be seized. 
[d. The protections provided by the fourth amendment have been held by the Supreme Court 
to be applicable to the states by virtue of the Due Process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
16 Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1357 (E.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd, 749 
F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984), afl'd, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986). 
17 Dow Chem. Co., 536 F. Supp. at 1375. 
18 Dow Chem. Co., 749 F.2d at 313. See infra note 130 and accompanying text. 
19 Dow Chem. Co., 106 S. Ct. at 1827. 
20 [d. 
21 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) ("the special protections accorded by the 
Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers and effects,' is not to be 
extended to the open fields"). 
22 Dow Chem. Co., 106 S. Ct. at 1825. 
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lems presented by height, duration, and observation enhancement 
are inherent in the use of aerial surveillance. Their abuse can result 
in a fourth amendment violation. A further unresolved problem is 
the availability of this information to competitors. The designation 
of a business as an open field deprives a business of an individualized 
review that would take into account these variables. 
This Comment does not call for a reversal of the Dow decision. 
Rather, it points out that the Dow decision decreases the protection 
previously accorded observed parties. This Comment concludes that 
a post-surveillance notice requirement to an observed business would 
be an effective substitute for the Supreme Court's failure to consider 
the variables of aerial surveillance. This notice would not eliminate 
the problems caused by height, duration or observation enhance-
ment. Post-surveillance notice would, however, mitigate the problem 
of a competing business gaining the information collected in an aerial 
investigation by allowing the observed party the opportunity to 
request that the information remain confidential within the EPA. 
This Comment first discusses the fourth amendment and admin-
istrative search warrants. The second section examines the protec-
tions that an observed business is denied in a warrantless aerial 
investigation. This Comment then examines four variables of aerial 
surveillance. An evaluation of these factors shows what types of 
problems aerial surveillance poses to the observed, regardless of an 
open field designation. Finally, this Comment discusses how a post-
surveillance notice requirement would protect an observed business 
from a competitor gaining trade secret information through the ac-
quisition of the EPA's photographs. 
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
SEARCH WARRANT 
A. The Fourth Amendment 
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourth amendment has 
always been problematic. 23 The Dow decision does little to end the 
confusion. An evaluation of Dow and its impact on future EPA aerial 
surveillance would be incomplete without some analysis of the cur-
rent status of the fourth amendment and the open fields exception. 24 
23 U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV. See supra note 15 for full text to fourth amendment. 
24Id. 
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The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution acts as 
a prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures."25 Under 
the fourth amendment, in order for a search to be constitutional, the 
investigating party must obtain a warrant, issuable only upon a 
showing of probable cause,26 prior to the search. 27 Whether the 
fourth amendment's protections apply lies in whether the act in 
question is defined as a "search" or a "seizure. "28 By fashioning 
different tests to define whether an activity is a search, the Supreme 
Court has declined to make the fourth amendment a general protec-
tor of privacy rights against all governmental activity.29 The appli-
cability of the fourth amendment to searches currently can be de-
termined through the use of two tests: the "reasonable expectation 
of privacy" test30 and the open fields exception, which the Court 
applied in DOW. 31 
The Supreme Court first announced the open fields exception in 
Hester v. United States. 32 In upholding the use of evidence obtained 
through warrantless surveillance in a large open area, Justice 
Holmes stated: "The special protection accorded by the Fourth 
Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers and 
effects' is not extended to open fields. The distinction between the 
latter and the house is as old as the common law. "33 The Court did 
not expand on this reasoning and failed to clarify it in succeeding 
years. Between 1924 and 1983 the Court decided only one open fields 
case. 34 
25Id. 
26 See generally, W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE-A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 3.2 (1978). Probable cause has been found to exist when H[Klnown facts and 
circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that an 
offense has been or is being committed." United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819,821 (D.C. Cir. 
1972). 
27 See generally Camara v. Municipal Court of the City & County of San Francisco, 387 
U.S. 523, 528 (1966). 
28 Note, Defining a Fourth Amendment Search: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Post-
Katz Jurisprudence, 61 WASH. L. REV. 191 (1986). 
29 Note, Oliver v. United States: The Open Fields Doctrine Survives Katz, 63 N.C.L. REV. 
546, 550 (1985). See also United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (W.D. Mich. 
1980) (HThe Fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, not all searches 
and seizures. "). 
30 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
31 Dow Chem. Co., 106 S. Ct. at 1825. 
32 265 U.S. at 59 (concealed revenue officers observe defendant handling illegal liquor in an 
open area near his home). 
38Id. at 59. 
:14 Air Pollution Variance Bd. of Col. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974). In 
Variance Board, state inspectors entered the outdoor premises of the respondent for the 
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In 1983, though, the Supreme Court re-affirmed the open fields 
exception in Oliver v. United States. 35 In Oliver, the Supreme Court 
held that the use of evidence gained by police in the warrantless 
search of a farm was constitutional because the property searched 
was considered an open field. 36 The Court used this occasion to clarify 
the open fields exception to the fourth amendment. 37 In Oliver, 
writing for the majority, Justice Powell explained that the fourth 
amendment does not protect activities conducted in open fields be-
cause these areas are not of the type where the activities the amend-
ment seeks to protect take place. 38 Society, Justice Powell continued, 
has no interest in protecting activities that go on in open fields. 39 In 
a strict interpretation of the fourth amendment,40 the Court held 
that because open fields are not within the meaning of "persons, 
houses, papers and effects,"41 they deserve none of the amendment's 
protections. 42 Further, the Court held that even if the government's 
intrusion onto an open field is considered a trespass at common law, 
this does not automatically negate the operation of the exception. 43 
Property rights, the Court held, do not decide the right of the 
government to carryon investigations. 44 
purposes of conducting tests on smoke from the respondent's chimneys. Id. at 863. The Court 
relied elll Hester in determining that the open fields exception applied as the inspector was 
not on premises from which the public was excluded and because he had viewed smoke which 
was visible to everyone in the surrounding area. Id. at 865. 
'" 466 U.S. 170 (1983). 
'11; Id. at 184. The Oliver decision actually involved two almost identical cases. Id. In the 
first, Oliver v. United States, two Kentucky State policemen, acting on anonymous tips drove 
to petitioner's farm to search for marijuana. Id. at 173. The officers walked around a gate 
preventing entry onto the property, along a road leading to a field over a mile from petitioner's 
house. Id. There they found the marijuana. Id. In the second case, Maine v. Thornton, Maine 
police, again acting on a tip, searched a wooded area behind respondent's house for marijuana. 
Id. at 174. The officers entered the woods by a path that lay between respondent's residence 
and a neighboring house. Id. 
", Id. at 173 ("We granted certiorari in these cases to clarify confusion that has arisen as to 
the continued vitality of this doctrine. "). 
," Id. at 179 ("[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the 
Amendment is intended to shelter from governmental interference or surveillance."). 
"" Id. ("There is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, such as the 
cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields. "). 
40 Note, Oliver v. United States: Powell Chases Katz Out of the Open Fields, 62 DEN. U.L. 
REV. 899, 906 (1985) [hereinafter Powell Chases Katz]; Note, The Fourth Amendment in the 
Age of Aerial Surveillance: Curtains for the Curtilage?, 60 N. Y. U. L. REV. 725, 728 (1985) 
[hereinafter Cnrtains]. 
41 U.S. CONST. AMEND, IV. See supra note 15 for full text to fourth amendment. 
4" Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176-77 (1983). 
41Id. at 183 ("Nor is the government's intrusion upon an open field a 'search' in the 
constitutional sense because that intrusion is a trespass at common law. "). 
44 Id. (,"The premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search 
and seize has been discredited."'(quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)). 
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While more fully explaining the reasoning behind the open fields 
exception, the Oliver decision did little to determine the limits of its 
use. 45 Defining the exception's scope seems more a matter of when 
it cannot be used, rather than when it can be used. If the item or 
place being searched is literally a person, house, paper, or effect, 
the open fields exception clearly does not apply. In Oliver the Court 
stated explicitly that the term "effects" cannot include open fields. 46 
Thus, this decision solves any ambiguity that term presents.47 
One limitation on the open fields exception lies in the determina-
tion of whether the area being searched is or is not "curtilage."48 
Traditionally, curtilage is the vicinity around the home. 49 Because 
curtilage is closely associated with the home, the Oliver Court held 
that this area falls under the fourth amendment's protections. 50 The 
Court, however, declined to delineate the limits of curtilage, merely 
stating that curtilage is that area to which the activities associated 
with the home extend51 and whose determination rests on factors 
giving an individual a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area. 52 
Thus, determining whether an area is curtilage plays a role in the 
use of the open fields exception. 53 
45 See genemlly, POWELL CHASES KATZ, supra note 40, at 909-12 (noting several problems 
Oliver left unresolved). 
40 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176-77. After examining James Madison's proposal for the fourth 
amendment, which used the word "property" instead of "effects," the Court concluded, "[T)he 
term 'effects' is less inclusive than 'property' and cannot be said to encompass open fields." 
Id. 
47 Id. 
4H Id. at 180. 
49 Id. The Court noted that, "[T)he common law distinguished 'open fields' from the 'curti-
lage,' the land immediately surrounding and associated with the home. The distinction implies 
that only the curtilage, not the neighboring open fields, warrants the Fourth Amendment 
protections that attach to the home." Id. 
50Id. 
51 Id. Traditionally, the term "curtilage" has been used to describe those areas within the 
"[C)luster of buildings constituting the habitation or dwelling place .... " Bare v. Common-
wealth, 122 Va. 783, 794, 94 S.E. 168, 172 (1917). Courts have examined the curtilage question 
and concluded the determinative factors to be the area's (1) proximity to the dwelling; (2) 
inclusion in an enclosure around the dwelling; and (3) its use in the domestic life of the family. 
Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 25 (10th Cir. 1956), cen. denied, 351 U.S. 932 (1956). 
Recently, the Supreme Court held that the protection of curtilage is essentially a protection 
of privacy linked to the home. California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1812 (1986). 
52 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1983). Courts "have defined the curtilage ... 
by reference to the factors that determine whether an individual reasonably may expect that 
an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain private." Id. 
58 See generally United States v. Long, 674 F.2d 848, 852-53 (llth Cir. 1982) (area in 
question considered an open field and not curtilage because no residence nearby); United 
States v. Brown, 487 F.2d 208, 210 (4th Cir. 1973), cen. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974) (area 
held an open field because curtilage does not extend to areas surrounding homes); De-
Montmorency v. State, 40 So. 2d 858, 863 (Fla. App. 1981) (area not curtilage because 200 
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The accessibility of an area to public view may also limit the open 
fields exception. One of the reasons for the open fields doctrine lies 
in the fact that these areas are generally observable to the public 
and police. 54 In the only open fields case decided by the Supreme 
Court between 1924 and Oliver, Air Pollution Variance Board of 
Colorado v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 55 the Court noted this idea in its 
use of the exception. The Western Alfalfa Court invoked the open 
fields doctrine because what was observed could have been observed 
by anyone in the surrounding area. 56 However, the Oliver Court 
made clear that the applicability of the open fields doctrine is not 
automatically negated simply because there is an attempt to conceal 
activity from public view. 57 What is important in cases involving the 
degree of view is whether the intrusion infringes upon the values 
protected by the fourth amendment. 58 A number of courts have 
examined this idea of the visibility of objects or places and the 
invocation of the open fields doctrine. 59 
The test that courts currently use to determine whether an activ-
ity is a "search" that deserves fourth amendment protection involves 
an evaluation of the observed's expectation of privacy. 60 Justice Har-
lan first articulated this oft-cited61 test in his concurrence in Katz v. 
United States. 62 To determine whether the method of investigation 
yards away from dwelling). Cf, United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992,993 (4th Cir. 1981) 
(area 150 feet from house still considered within the curtilage). 
54 Oliver, 466 U. S. at 179. 
55 416 U.S. 861 (1974). 
56Id. at 862-63 (inspector "had inspected what anyone in the city who was near the plant 
could see in the sky-plumes of smoke"). 
57 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 ("The test of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to 
conceal assertedly 'private' activity .... "). 
513 Id. 
59 See, e.g., United States v. Bassford, 601 F. Supp. 1324, 1331 (D. Me. 1985) (aerial 
observation of marijuana not violative of fourth amendment due to number of planes which 
could view it at any time); United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1980)(surveillance 
of house and barn not violative of fourth amendment because they were clearly visible from 
highway); People v. McClaugherty, 193 Colo. 360, 363, 566 P.2d 361, 363-64 (1970) (pasture 
area an open field because accessible to employees); State v Byers, 359 So. 2d 84, 86 (La. 
1978) (legitimate expectation of privacy existed because property not visible from road); State 
v. Charvat, 175 Mont. 267, 271-72, 573 P.2d 660, 661-63 (1978) (no legal expectation of privacy 
existed because ranch area left untended and access was to anyone). 
60 California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1811; Smith v. Maryland, 422 U.S. 735, 739 
(1979)(reasonable expectation of privacy test the "lodestar" in determining fourth amendment 
protection). 
61 See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 
1, 7 (1977); United States v. Milly, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 
739. 
62 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The petitioner was convicted for trans-
mitting wagering information by telephone. Id. at 348. The conviction was attained, over the 
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is a search, courts use a two-pronged test: first, the court evaluates 
whether the individual has exhibited an actual subjective expectation 
of privacy and, second, the court asks whether the expectation is 
one that society recognizes as reasonable. 63 If the answer to either 
of these questions is negative, then the actor's conduct is not deemed 
an unreasonable "search" and a court will not require a warrant for 
the activity. 
The significance of the Katz test is that it shifted the consideration 
of privacy from places to people. 64 Previously, the Court decided 
whether a privacy expectation existed by determining whether there 
was a physical invasion of one's person or property.65 By shifting 
this consideration, the Court has fashioned a test where no single 
factor is the sole determinant of whether an !ndividual's expectation 
of privacy merits fourth amendment protection. 66 The factors the 
Court takes into consideration in its decision can be categorized into 
three general groups: (1) the individual's property rights; (2) the 
precautions taken by the individual to maintain his privacy; and (3) 
the characteristics of the property.67 Further, the Court will attempt 
to balance the investigatory act and its effect on the individual 
against the effectiveness of the conduct in law enforcement. 68 
Critics of the Katz test69 thought it narrowed the open fields 
exception to the point of almost uselessness because the per se 
petitioner's objection, by the use of electronic listening and recording devices placed on the 
outside of a public telephone booth. Id. 
63 Id. at 361. Justice Harlan reasoned, "My understanding of the rule that has emerged 
from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited 
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." Id. 
64 Id. at 351. See also Note, Aerial Surveillance: Overlooking the Fourth Amendment, 50 
FORDHAM L. REV. 271, 275 (1985) (it is the person, not the place, that is to be safeguarded). 
65 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 446 (1927). Olmstead had held that in order for 
one's fourth amendment rights to be violated there must have been an official search and 
seizure or physical invasion. Id. After Katz, though, the Court no longer looked to whether 
the area in question was an area protected by the constitution. The Court instead looked to 
whether the government intruded upon a privacy interest upon which an individual justifiably 
relied. Note, supra note 29, at 552. 
66 Note, supra note 64, at 275-76. 
67 I d. at 276. 
68 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan wrote: 
This question [to use electronic listening devices without a warrant] must, in my 
view, be narrowed by assessing the nature of a particular practice and the likely 
extent of its impact on the individual's sense of security balanced against the utility 
of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement. 
Id. See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1978) ("The permissibility of a particular 
law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests."). 
69 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
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exception to the fourth amendment's protection conflicted with the 
evaluation of factors the Katz test requires. 70 However, with the re-
affirmation of the exception in the Oliver71 case, this is no longer 
true. 72 As privacy in open fields may never be legitimately de-
manded,73 any time an area is so designated, that area will not be 
protected under the Katz test. 74 Thus, the Supreme Court, in open 
fields cases, forecloses any analysis of objective or subjective expec-
tations of privacy in an analysis of fourth amendment protection. 
B. The Administrative Search Warrant 
The issue in the Dow case lies in the EPA's failure to acquire an 
administrative search warrant. 75 A brief review of the requirements 
for a warrant of this type will show what protections are denied an 
observed party with the use of warrantless aerial surveillance. 
An administrative search or inspection is one which is carried out 
by the government to promote the health, safety and welfare of both 
commercial and non-commercial premises. 76 An administrative 
search warrant differs from a criminal search warrant because the 
degree of probable cause needed for the warrant's acquisition is 
less. 77 For a criminal search warrant the probable cause required 
must satisfy the questions of whether (1) the items are in fact seiz-
able by virtue of being connected with criminal activity and (2) the 
items in question will be found in the place to be searched. 78 The 
probable cause for an administrative search warrant, however, is 
not dependent on this specific knowledge, but on more general no-
70 Note, Affirmation of the Open Fields Doctrine: The Oliver Twist, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 729, 
734 (1985). 
71 466 U.S. 170 (1983). 
72 Powell Chases Katz, supra note 40, at 905 (Oliver was a "revitalization" of open fields 
doctrine). 
73 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178. 
74 Powell Chases Katz, supra note 40, at 905. 
75 Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1824 (1986). 
76 See generally Note, Administrative Searches and Seizures: What Happened to Camara 
and See, 50 WASH. L. REV. 341 (1974); w. LAFAVE, supra note 26, § 10.l. 
77 Note, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 
28 U. CHI. L. REV. 664, 687 (1961). For a criminal search warrant the probable cause required 
must satisfy the magistrate that (1) the items are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected 
with criminal activity and (2) the items in question will be found in the place searched. [d. 
The degree of evidence requires personal knowledge or information reasonably trustworthy 
to warrant a man of reasonable caution that an offense has been committed. Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949). 
78 Note, supra note 77, at 687. 
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tions of a violation. 79 The principal case explicating the requirements 
for an administrative search warrant is Camara v. Municipal Court 
of the City and County of San Francisco. 80 Prior to Camara, search-
ers did not need warrants to conduct administrative searches. Ca-
mara reversed the idea that administrative searches were the ex-
ception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement81 and held 
that such searches always require a warrant. 82 
The decision to issue a search warrant must be made by a neutral 
judicial officer. 83 For an administrative search to be carried out, it 
must first be clear that the search is a reasonable one. 84 The question 
of reasonableness can only be answered by balancing the need to 
conduct the search against the resulting invasion of privacy.85 The 
criteria courts use in this test involve (1) whether the legislation the 
search is carried out under has long been publically and judicially 
accepted; (2) whether the public demands the enforcement of the 
legislation and no other technique would be as successful; and (3) 
whether the search involves a relatively limited invasion of the 
citizen's privacy.86 After finding reasonableness, probable cause ex-
ists if the party being investigated is one covered by the regulatory 
79 Camara v. Municipal Court of the City & County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 538 
(1966). 
80 Id. Camara involved the conviction of appellant for failing to allow an inspector of the 
Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Department of Public Health to enter his 
apartment without a warrant. Id. at 525-27. In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court 
held that a warrant was required for administrative searches. Id. at 533. See also See v. City 
of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1966) (administrative entry onto private portions of commercial 
premises must be with a warrant); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270 
(1974) (border patrol's search of Mexican citizen's car required a warrant). 
81 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 373 (1959). 
82 Camara, 387 U.S. at 534. 
Id. 
[W]e hold that administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant 
intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, that such searches 
when authorized and conducted, without a warrant procedure lack the traditional 
safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual, and that the 
reasons put forth in Frank v. Maryland and in other cases for upholding these 
warrantless searches are insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of the 
Fourth Amendment's protections. 
83 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1947). See generally Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443 (1970). 
84 Camara, 387 U.S. at 534 (1966). The Court noted, "In cases in which the Fourth Amend-
ment requires that a warrant to search be obtained, 'probable cause' is the standard by which 
a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness." 
Id. 
85 Id. at 536-37. 
86 Id. at 537. 
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scheme of the controlling statute. 87 Unlike the probable cause nec-
essary to obtain satisfaction of legislative standards in criminal cases, 
the satisfaction of these standards is not dependent on specific knowl-
edge. 88 Courts may base the decision to grant an administrative 
search warrant on general ideas of the area or item being investi-
gated. 89 Thus, before issuing an administrative search warrant, a 
judicial officer makes two determinations: first, the determination of 
the reasonableness of the inspection program and, second, the more 
specific determination of whether the particular inspection contem-
plated is a part of that program. 90 
The administrative search warrant protects the investigated party 
from a privacy intrusion or possible abuse by the agency in the 
process of the investigation. 91 Without a warrant, those being inves-
tigated have no safeguards against such misuse of administrative 
ability to carryon a search. With a warrant, individualized review 
is guaranteed, thus providing the party in question with the safe-
guards of a magistrate's decision. 92 
There is an exception to the administrative search warrant re-
quirement. 93 This exception arises in emergency situations. 94 These 
situations usually arise when there is a danger that the suspected 
violation will be hidden during the time it takes to secure a warrant. 95 
Allowing warrantless searches in these situations is consistent with 
87Id. at 538 ("[I)t is obvious that 'probable cause' to issue a warrant to inspect must exist 
if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are 
satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. "). 
88 Id. 
89Id. ("Such standards, which will vary with the municipal program being enforced, may 
be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the building ... or the condition of the 
entire area .... "). 
90 W. LAFAVE, supra note 26, § 10.1. 
91 Camara, 387 U.S. at 532. 
Id. 
Under the present system [without a warrant), when the inspector demands entry, 
the occupant has no way of knowing whether enforcement of the municipal code 
involved required inspection of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits of 
the inspector's powers to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector 
himself is acting under proper authorization. 
92 Id. at 533. 
93Id. at 539. The Court actually mentions two exceptions. Id. The second exception has to 
do with the idea of consent. Id. As with other constitutional questions, one may waive one's 
fourth amendment rights by consent to a warrantless search. Id. 
94 Id. at 539 ("[N)othing we say today is intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even 
without a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld in emergency situations."). See, e.g., 
North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (city has right to 
seize unwholesome food without prior hearing). 
95 W. LAFAVE, supra note 26, § 10.1. 
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the requirement that an administrative search be reasonable as only 
a valid public interest will justify the intrusion. 96 
The Administrative Procedure Act deals with administrative 
searches. 97 However, this Act provides few guidelines for such an 
investigation. 98 The Act merely states that "inspection, or other 
investigative act or demand may not be issued, made or enforced 
except as authorized by law. "99 This requirement confines the inves-
tigatory powers of an agency to the jurisdiction and purposes of the 
agency. 100 The Act does not delineate the procedures an agency must 
follow in carrying out a search. Critics have, however, interpreted 
the Act as allowing the agencies to formulate their own parameters 
in investigatory procedure and scope. 101 
By failing to obtain a warrant, the EPA denied Dow Chemical 
Company a number of protections. Because there was no warrant, 
the EPA did not give a neutral magistrate a chance to judge the 
96 See Camara v. Municipal Court of the City & County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 539 
(1966). 
97 5 U.S.C. § 555(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
96 Note, Administrative Investigatory Authority and APA Rule Making Procedures, 57 
B.U.L. REV. 225, 225 (1977). 
!19 5 U.S.C. § 555(c). The section reads in part 
Id. 
Process, requirement of a report, inspection, or other investigative act or demand 
may not be issued, made, or enforced except as authorized by law. A person compelled 
to submit data or evidence is entitled to retain or, on payment of lawfully prescribed 
costs, procure a copy or transcript thereof, except that in a nonpublic investigatory 
proceeding the witness may for good cause be limited to inspection of the official 
transcript of his testimony. 
100 Note, supra note 98, at 229 (noting that legislative history points to this interpretation). 
101 Id. at 228-34. The only memorandum or guideline promulgated by the EPA dealing with 
aerial surveillance was issued after the District Court heard the Dow Chemical case. Telephone 
interview with Herbert G. Johnson, Senior Legal Advisor, Office of Criminal Enforcement, 
Environmental Protection Agency (February 2, 1987) [hereinafter Johnson Interview]. This 
memorandum was internal to the EPA's criminal enforcement division and related only to 
overflights in criminal investigations. Id. The memorandum first examined the existing state 
of the law. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Legal and Enforcement Counsel, 
Overflights Initiated by Criminal Enforcement Division, (June 17, 1983)(Internal Memoran-
dum). It then had three basic guidelines the EPA criminal division had to follow in conducting 
aerial surveillance. First, no overflights were to be conducted in the Eastern District of 
Michigan. Next, search warrants were to be obtained for any non-consensual aerial overflight 
of a private facility in which the owner had manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Id. However, no warrant was required for aerial surveillance of open fields, woods, yards, or 
other areas visible to the "land-based public." I d. Finally, before initiating any overflight an 
EPA criminal division agent had to consult the local United States Attorney and the Criminal 
Enforcement Division legal staff on the need for a warrant. Id. Currently, the EPA has no 
memorandum, or policy or guidance documeh~, dealing with aerial surveillance. Investigations 
utilizing this method are dealt with on an ad hoc basis in the light of the Supreme Court's 
Dow Chemical decision. Johnson Interview, supra. 
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reasonableness of the search by weighing Dow's suspected violations 
and the enforcement procedure under the Clean Air Act102 against 
the invasion the aerial surveillance posed to Dow. Further, because 
no magistrate determined whether any degree of probable cause 
existed, the EPA never had to disclose what it was searching for or 
whether any of its suspicions about the factory were anchored in 
truth. 
C. Application of Open Fields and Katz 
Courts have used the Katz test to evaluate the constitutionality 
of aerial surveillance in a number of cases. 103 This Comment argues 
that the reasonable expectation of privacy test protects the rights 
of the surveyed more effectively than does the open fields doctrine. 
This increased protection is primarily due to the fact that the ex-
pectation of privacy test evaluates various criteria that contribute 
to an individual's privacy expectation. These criteria involve an eval-
uation of the specifics of the search itself, such as geography and the 
nature of the building searched,104 as well as a balancing of the need 
to enforce protective regulations against the right of privacy in-
vaded.105 In creating a blanket prohibition of consideration of these 
variables, in an open fields setting, the Supreme Court has foreclosed 
from factory operators like Dow the protection presented by indi-
vidualized review. The Court's assertion that no privacy rights exist 
in open fields does not negate the fact that individualized review 
may reveal situations where a privacy right may exist. A comparison 
of cases that have used the Katz test against Dow's open fields 
holding shows what considerations the Court has denied businesses 
and why this safeguard of a post-surveillance notice requirement is 
needed to take its place. 
In People v. Sneed,106 the California Court of Appeals declined the 
immediate application of the open fields doctrine and, instead, took 
102 See supra note 3. 
103 See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1379-81 (9th Cir. 1980) (no reasonable 
expectation of privacy due to frequency of aerial flights over area); United States v. DeBacker, 
493 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in field of 
marijuana); Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 117, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589 (1973) 
(no reasonable expectation of privacy in three-quarter acre tract of land because no expectation 
of privacy exhibited by owners); State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 421, 570 P.2d 1323, 1329 
(1977) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in field of marijuana). 
104 People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 541, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146, 150 (1973). 
105 DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. at 108!. 
106 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973). 
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into account a number of other factors.107 The Sneed case involved 
the warrantless aerial surveillance, by police, of a marijuana patch 
located approximately 125 feet from appellant's house, behind a 
barn. 108 In assessing the constitutionality of the overflights, the court 
explicitly declined to use the approach of applying such tests as the 
open fields test.l09 Instead, the court held that only by review of 
numerous factors, such as the premises' location, structures adjacent 
to the premises, and fencing around the area, could it reach a com-
petent decision. 110 . 
After evaluating two of these factors, the Sneed court held that 
the officers' conduct was a search that required a warrant. III First, 
the police had contended that the marijuana was in plain view. 112 
The police argued that the marijuana was available for warrantless 
inspection because crop dusters and mosquito abatement helicopters 
frequently flew over the area. 113 The court dismissed this contention 
after finding no actual evidence of such flights.114 Further, the court 
relied on the proposition that only by legally being in a position to 
make an observation can one utilize the plain view exception. 115 With 
this in mind, the court held the police's aerial view unreasonable. 116 
The Sneed court felt that the low level of the helicopter flight made 
107 See also Dean, 35 Cal. App. 3d at 117, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 589; United States v. Bassford, 
601 F. Supp. 1324, 1330 (1985) (height of observer, size of observed, frequency of observation 
are all taken into account); National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 608 
F. Supp. 945, 955 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (repeated hoverings, buzzings and dive bombings not 
justified by a lack of reasonable expectation of privacy). 
108 Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d at 540, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 149. Prior to the overflight the officers 
had determined that they would be unable to see the marijuana from ground level. Id. Instead, 
they utilized a helicopter. Id. They flew the helicopter over the appellant's twenty acre ranch 
at heights as low as twenty to twenty-five feet before finally finding the marijuana. Id. 
109Id. at 541, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 149. 
l1°Id. at 541, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 150. 
Id. 
There are countless thousands of permutations of factual situations, each presenting 
its own problems. Any effort to generalize is fraught with danger. However, it is 
readily apparent that a number of factors must be considered, among which are the 
location of the premises, that is, whether in an urban or isolated area, the existence 
or non-existence and height of natural or artificial structures adjacent to the premises, 
the height and sight-proof character of the fencing, the location of public or common 
walkways adjacent to the premises, the type and character of invasion by the gov-
ernmental authority, and other unforeseeable factors which will undoubtedly arise 
on a case by case basis. 
111 Id. at 540-43, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 149-5l. 
112 Id. at 540, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 149. 
113Id. 
114Id. 
115Id. at 542, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 15l. 
116Id. 
608 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 15:593 
the surveillance unreasonable and thus prevented the use of the 
plain view exception.117 The court, then, reached a conclusion it 
might otherwise not have reached had it immediately invoked the 
open fields exception. 118 This evaluation provided the surveyed with 
protection from an abuse of aerial surveillance it would not have 
received under an open fields characterization. 119 
The United States District Court for the Western District of Mich-
igan, in United States v. DeBacker,120 also declined to dispense with 
the Katz test by automatically applying the open fields exception. 121 
In DeBacker, police, again searching for marijuana, flew over defen-
dant's farm without a warrant. 122 The farm was located in a sparsely 
populated location and the marijuana patch was in a forest area. 123 
With the Katz test's aims in mind, the DeBacker court specifically 
rejected a per se open fields exception in evaluating the legality of 
the flight. 124 Instead, the court satisfied the Katz test by performing 
a balancing test between the utility of the conduct for enforcement 
of the law and the invasion of privacy the investigation caused. 125 
The court weighed the defendant's expectation of privacy in an open 
field setting against the value of permitting such surveillance for 
drug enforcement purposes. 126 The court concluded that the latter 
117Id. at 542-43, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 151. The court held 
Id. 
While appellant certainly had no reasonable expectation of privacy from his neighbor 
and his neighbor's permittees and none from airplanes and helicopters flying at legal 
and reasonable heights, we have concluded that he did have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy to be free from noisy police observation by helicopters from the air at 20-
25 feet and that such an invasion was an unreasonable governmental intrusion into 
the serenity and privacy of his backyard. 
11H See generally Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1983). 
119 Id. 
120 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich. 1980). 
121 Id. at 1081. "Katz compels a more sensitive reading of the Fourth Amendment .... 
Instead of declaring entire areas as outside of Fourth Amendment protection, I believe Katz 
compels an analysis of the particular type of surveillance, and its effects on the privacy and 
security of citizens." I d. 
122 I d. at 1079. 
12:1 Id. Acting on an anonymous tip, the Michigan State Police actually flew over the farm 
on two separate occasions. I d. On the second flight, at a height of fifty feet, the police spotted 
marijuana. Id. On the basis of this information the police secured a warrant and seized 
contraband from the farm. Id. 
124 I d. at 1081. 
125 Id. "Fourth Amendment analysis requires 'assessing the nature of the particular practice 
and the likely extent of its impact on the individual's sense of security balanced against the 
utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement.'" I d. (quoting United States v. White, 
401 U.S. 745, 746 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
126Id. (the minor expectations of privacy of the defendant do not outweigh the utility of 
such surveillance). 
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outweighed the former and held that the defendant did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 127 While holding that the surveil-
lance did not violate the fourth amendment, the DeBacker court 
nevertheless sought to preserve review of the defendant's individual 
rights. 128 The court did not simply refuse such consideration through 
an open fields conclusion. 
When contrasted with the individual analysis the Katz test affords, 
a court's utilization of the open fields exception provides little pro-
tection to the observed. 129 An evaluation of the Supreme Court's 
holding in Dow illustrates this fact. Unlike the court of appeals, the 
Supreme Court declined to apply the Katz test. 130 The Court, in re-
affirming Oliver, approached the administrative search warrant issue 
from a consideration of whether the plant was curtilage or an open 
field. 131 In determining whether to consider Dow's plant an open 
field, the Court described the plant's characteristics as somewhere 
between an open field and curtilage. 132 Ultimately, the Court con-
cluded that the plant was more like an open field and, thus, there 
was no need for a warrant. 133 The Court did not engage in a detailed 
evaluation of such factors as the plant's location or make-up.134 Nor 
127Id. 
128Id. 
129 See United States v. Marbury, 732 F.2d 390,398 (5th Cir. 1984) (aerial search over gravel 
pit held constitutional as area an open field); Wellford v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 297, 302, 
315 S.E.2d 235, 238 (1984) (warrantless aerial surveillance is a question of open field versus 
curtilage); People v. Abbott, 483 N.Y.S.2d 452, 458, 105 A.D.2d 1029, 1030 (A.D.3 Dept. 
1984) (by defendant's own admission the area in question was an open field and the warrantless 
search therefore allowed). 
1:30 Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 311 (6th Cir. 1984). In determining 
whether Dow had a subjective expectation of privacy, the Katz test's first prong, the court 
looked to the company's manifestations of that desire for privacy. Id. at 312. The court 
reasoned that Dow had this expectation of privacy from the ground due to the fence it built 
and the guards it employed. Id. at 312. The court noted, however, that Dow took no such 
precautions against intrusions from the air, even though the plant was located in a flight path 
of a nearby airport. Id. at 312. The court used this comparison of the precautions Dow 
maintained to conclude that they had no actual expectation of privacy from the air. Id. at 313. 
Looking to the second aspect of the test, the court concluded that even if Dow did have this 
expectation of privacy it would have been unreasonable because the factory was an open field. 
Id. The court concluded that the EPA's action did not constitute a search and, thus, no 
warrant was required. Id. 
131 Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1825 (1986). The Court conceded that 
while Dow had a reasonable, legitimate and objective expectation of privacy in the interior of 
its buildings, such was not applicable to views from aerial surveillance. Id. 
1:32 Id. at 1825-26. "The area at issue here can perhaps be seen as falling somewhere between 
'open fields' and curtilage, but lacking some of the critical characteristics of both." Id. 
133Id. at 1827. The Court did, however, state, "[AJny physical entry by the EPA into any 
enclosed area would raise significantly different questions .... " Id. 
1:34 I d. at 1827. 
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did the Court attempt to balance Dow's needs against the EPA's 
right to enforcement of the Clean Air Act with aerial surveillance. 135 
The Dow decision has created a situation where, if courts deter-
mine that a business is an open field, the business automatically will 
not have the right to fourth amendment protection. 136 The numerous 
factors that the Katz testl37 would consider, as well as applying a 
balancing test, are not considered. The omission of such considera-
tions make a post-surveillance notice requirement necessary to pro-
vide some protection to the business' privacy interest. 138 
III. VARIABLES OF AERIAL SURVEILLANCE 
As determined by the Sneed court, the legitimacy of a warrantless 
act of aerial surveillance can be affected by any number of factors. 139 
This Comment considers as most significant the variables of height, 
duration of overflights, enhancement of photographic observation, 
and the availability of gathered information to competing busi-
nesses. 140 Abuse of these variables could lead to fourth amendment 
violations. 141 Categorical application of the open fields exception de-
nies consideration of these factors in determining the legality of a 
search. Such denial may result in unbridled discretion by the EPA 
in the use of this method of surveillance with no countervailing 
1:l5Id. 
n6 Powell Chases Katz, supra note 40, at 905. 
137 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
138 See infra notes 250-60 and accompanying text. 
139 People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 541, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146, 150 (1973). 
140 Curtains, supra note 40, at 757. "In making its inquiry, the court should pay special 
attention to factors such as the altitude, duration, techniques, sense-enhancement, and novelty 
of the surveillance." Id.; see also United States v. Bassford, 601 F. Supp. 1324, 1330 (D. Me. 
1985). In Bassford, the Maine State Police aerially surveyed the defendant's property without 
a warrant in an investigation of an illegal cultivation of marijuana plants. Bassford, 601 F. 
Supp. at 1326. In upholding the use of aerial surveillance, the court noted several of the 
factors involved in an aerial surveillance question. Id. at 1330. Among these factors were the 
height of the observing aircraft, the nature of the area observed, and the size of the objects 
being observed. Id. After considering a number of variables, the court concluded that the 
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy and, thus, no warrant was required. 
Id. at 1332; see also State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 418, 570 P.2d 1323, 1328 (1977) (noting 
that if aircraft's height, duration over the property or the type of viewing device had been 
different, the court's decision upholding the aerial surveillance may have been different). 
141 See generally National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws V. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 
945 (N.D. Cal. 1985). This case involved California's Campaign Against Marijuana Planting's 
use of helicopters in the enforcement of laws. Id. at 949. The court held that the organization 
abused the use of these helicopters by repeatedly hovering, buzzing, and "dive bombing" 
numerous individuals and homes in its search for marijuana. Id. at 954. Testimony revealed 
that the helicopter pilots repeatedly harassed community members by following them or 
peering into their windows. Id. at 955-56. 
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checks. 142 This is not to suggest that simply because an area is 
designated as an open field, courts will tolerate large-scale abuse of 
these variables. The open fields exception may be inapplicable in 
situations where there is abuse of these factors. However, a desire 
to protect the observed should not be required only in situations of 
blatant conduct. A discussion of these variables illustrates their 
importance and shows why a post-surveillance notice requirement is 
needed to counter a court's failure to address these factors. 143 
A. Height of the Surveillance 
As was discussed in the Sneed case, for an investigator to claim 
the open fields defense to a fourth amendment challenge, there must 
be a legitimate right to be in the position to observe the subject. 144 
This right of position becomes significant in evaluating the variable 
of an aircraft's height. 145 In Sneed, the court felt that the low altitude 
of observation infringed the defendant's privacy rights, thus requir-
ing the investigator to procure a warrant. 146 If the police had flown 
at a reasonable height a warrant would not have been required. 147 
The court in National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana 
Laws (NORML) v. Mullen148 was also troubled by this abuse of 
altitude. The NORML case involved a number of abuses of helicopter 
surveillance in the enforcement of California's Campaign Against 
142 But cf. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,179 n.lO (1983). In Oliver the Court noted 
that "in most instances police will disturb no one when they enter upon open fields. These 
fields . . . are unlikely to provide the setting for activities whose privacy is sought to be 
protected by the fourth amendment." Id. (emphasis added). The Court seemed to recognize 
the fact that there will be times when a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in an open 
field setting. Id. Simply because an area is designated an open field does not mean that the 
courts will tolerate large-scale abuse of aerial surveillance variables. Id; see also Note, supra 
note 70, at 744. 
143 See infra notes 253-60 and accompanying text. 
144 People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 542, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146, 151 (1973). 
145 See also Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 477, 272 S.E.2d 923,925 (1981) (surveillance 
from the airplane not unreasonable if plane keeps proper distance between itself and observed); 
People v. Lashmet, 71 Ill. App. 3d 429, 432, 389 N.E.2d 888, 890 (1979) (no unreasonable 
search when altitude of helicopter was 2400 feet). 
146 Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d at 542-43, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 151. The court noted 
Id. 
While appellant certainly had no reasonable expectation of privacy from ... airplanes 
and helicopters flying at legal and reasonable heights, we have concluded that he did 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy to be free from noisy police observation by 
helicopters from the air at twenty to twenty-five feet .... 
147 Id. 
148 608 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Cal. 1985). 
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Marijuana Planting program.149 In several instances, individuals tes-
tified to being directly observed from heights of 50 to 150 feet. 150 
The NORML court held that it was this low altitude, among other 
things, that contributed to the unreasonableness of the surveillance 
because it was disruptive and intrusive. 151 
Under the Supreme Court's holding in Dow, the reasonableness 
of an aerial survey does not turn on an observing aircraft's altitude 
if the area being observed is designated an open field. 152 Such a 
designation, however, does not automatically foreclose an evaluation 
of an aircraft's height. Nonetheless, after Dow, it is conceivable that 
the EPA could fly over a factory at an altitude where the observers 
could circumvent factory protections thus infringing a legitimate 
privacy concern. 153 
B. Duration of the Surveillance 
Another variable of aerial surveillance is the duration of the sur-
veillance. 154 In State v. Stachler,155 the Supreme Court of Hawaii 
held that an aerial investigation by the police looking for marijuana 
plants was not a search. 156 However, the court noted that the du-
ration of the overflights was important. 157 The court went so far as 
to say that a prolonged surveillance might have changed its deci-
sion. 158 
149 I d. at 955-56. 
150Id. 
151Id. at 957 ("It is not just the highly disruptive character of low helicopter flights that 
distinguishes them from the common airplane overflights that we are all accustomed to .... "). 
152 Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1827 (1986). The Court noted that the 
factory "is open to the view and observations of persons in aircraft lawfully in the public 
airspace immediately above or sufficiently near the area for the reach of cameras." Id. 
153 The Court in Oliver v. United States noted the results in such a situation: 
The test of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly 
'private' activity. Rather, the correct inquiry is whether the government's intrusion 
infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
As we have explained, we find no basis for concluding that a police inspection of open 
fields accomplishes such an infringement. 
466 U.S. 170, 182-83 (1983). 
154 See generally United States v. Bassford, 601 F. Supp. 1324, 1330 (D. Me. 1985) (the 
duration of aerial surveillance should be a factor in judging reasonableness). 
155 58 Haw. 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977). 
156 Id. at 421, 570 P.2d at 1329. 
157 Id. at 419,570 P.2d at 1328 ("If the lower court had found ... continued aerial harassment 
or prolonged aerial surveillance of the Stachler property ... we might well decide differ-
ently."). 
158Id. 
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The court in the NORML case also relied on this factor of duration 
in its decision. 159 In NORML, one tactic used by helicopter pilots 
was hovering or repeatedly flying over individuals or homes in at-
tempts to discover violations of marijuana laws. 160 The court felt that 
this was another factor that contributed to the unreasonableness of 
the surveillance. 161 The court went on to say that this use of hovering 
could be a great threat to civil liberties. 162 
The danger posed by prolonged surveillance is analogous to the 
dangers asserted by the defendant in United States v. Knotts. 163 In 
that case, the Supreme Court held that the warrantless monitoring 
of a suspected drug manufacturer via an electronic "beeper" in his 
car was not a violation of his fourth amendment rights. 164 The de-
fendant argued that the use of these beepers could lead to twenty-
four hour police surveillance of citizens. 165 The police could watch 
and wait for a crime to occur. Similarly, in an extreme vein, an EPA 
helicopter could hover over a chemical plant waiting for some type 
of violation to occur. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in 
Knotts, declined to rule upon this prospective argument. 166 He did 
suggest, however, that in such a situation, a re-evaluation of the 
constitutionality of the surveillance may be required. 167 Protracted 
surveillance of this type then, could be an exception to the Court's 
holding in Knotts. 168 This is because duration or extensiveness is a 
factor in the determination of whether a search occurred. 169 
159 National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws V. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945, 957 (N.D. 
Cal. 1985). 
[d. 
It is not just the highly disruptive character oflow helicopter flights that distinguishes 
them from the common airplane overflights that we are all accustomed to, but also 
the degree of their intrusiveness into "the privacies" of life; an airplane can see far 
less than a helicopter that is hovering outside a bedroom window or over an open 
outhouse or shower. 
160 [d. at 955-56. 
161 [d. at 957. 
162 [d. 
16:3 460 U.S. 276 (1982). 
iG4 [d. at 285. 
165 [d. at 283-84. 
166 [d. at 284. 
lfi7 [d. 
16H Note, Tying Privacy in Knotts: Beeper Monitoring and Collective Fourth Amendment 
Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 297, 336 (1985) ("Su~h an exception would prohibit the warrantless 
monitoring of public automobile travel when conducted in a dragnet fashion, as, for example 
... an individual is tracked for an extended length of time."). 
169 [d. 
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Abuse of the duration variable may be harmful to workers within 
the manufacturing plant. 170 In Knotts, the Supreme Court held that 
through prolonged surveillance there is a loss of "freedom from 
attention."171 This is the freedom from being personally identified 
and held accountable to the rules of behavior for one's particular 
situation.172 Thus, for example, EPA surveillance carried on for an 
indefinite duration, robs a worker of his ability to function without 
the feeling that his every movement is being monitored. The Or-
wellian idea of an omnipresent "Big Brother" evokes a similar sense 
of personal infringement. 173 Such observation would, of course, be 
incidental to an agency's investigation. Nonetheless, in a situation 
with the potential for prolonged observation, this infringement 
would be difficult to avoid and investigators may violate privacy 
rights. 174 
Although the Knotts 175 decision suggests a re-evaluation of fourth 
amendment concerns if the surveillance is too protracted, the Dow 
decision foreclosed re-evaluation of this factor after an open fields 
designation. 176 Under Katz, this re-evaluation would necessarily in-
clude consideration of the observed's expectation of privacy. 177 Such 
an expectation of privacy may exist in situations where beeper mon-
itoring would occur if, for example, a beeper were placed in a 
house. 178 The duration of the surveillance would have an effect on 
reasonableness. However, in the case of a factory like Dow's, once 
designated an open field, no privacy expectation exists and an eval-
uation of the duration of surveillance may not occur. While such 
surveillance may be argued to be like police observation of an open 
170 [d. at 323. ("This privacy interest in freedom from attention may be protected by the 
solitude of being physically alone, or by the anonymity of blending into a large number of 
indifferent people.") 
171 [d. ("In addition to an interest in the concealment of information, the notion of privacy 
includes freedom from attention .... "). 
172 [d.; see also United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 948 (6th Cir. 1980) (Keith, J., 
concurring) ("[O]ur idea of freedom is offended and necessarily shrinks at the continued 
monitoring of personal movements. "). 
173 G. ORWELL, 1984 (1938). 
174 See, e.g., National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945, 
958 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (although difficult, helicopter pilots should avert their eyes from homes 
and curtilage while surveying, in order to protect fourth amendment rights). 
175 460 U.S. 276 (1982). 
176 lO6 S. Ct. 1819 (1986). 
l77 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). See also supra note 63 and accompanying 
text. 
178 See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (the monitoring of a "beeper" 
in a private residence, not open to visual surveillance, violated the Fourth Amendment because 
of the privacy expectation in the home). 
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street, it can be distinguished because it is within the enclosed 
confines of a factory where workers do not consciously expose them-
selves to outside observation. 
Because the Dow decision is so recent it is not yet clear if the 
Court will allow an egregious violation of the duration variable to 
go uncensored. Indeed, a situation of protracted surveillance of an 
open field may not be considered reasonable. However, the Dow 
decision did not expressly prohibit long-term surveillance of an open 
field area. 179 
c. Enhancement of the Surveillance 
A third variable of aerial surveillance is the degree of enhancement 
of the observation. ISO In Dow, the Court mentioned this variable, 
holding that surveillance conducted with highly sophisticated equip-
ment might have been constitutionally proscribed. lSI Satellite tech-
nology and sensitive listening devices that could penetrate walls or 
windows were examples the Court used as candidates for pro scrip-
tion. 1s2 
Other courts have also looked at this variable of surveillance. In 
United States v. Taborda,ls3 the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit judged a situation where police officers attempted to acquire 
information for a warrant by enhanced surveillance. l84 The court 
held that the information gathered for the warrant through the use 
of a telescope could not be the basis for the issuance of a warrant. 1S5 
The court held that the telescopic investigation itself constituted a 
search that should only have been done with a warrant. 1S6 The court 
held that the enhanced nature of the telescopic surveillance of the 
apartment's interior was a key factor in the invasion of the appel-
lant's privacy and in the unreasonableness of the observation. 1s7 The 
179 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986). 
1"0 Curtains, supra note 40, at 757. 
1"1 Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1826 (1986). The Court stated in dicta, 
"[Ilt may well be, as the Government concedes, that the surveillance of private property by 
using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public, such 
as satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant." [d. 
182 [d. 
IH:l 635 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1980). 
184 [d. at 133-34 (concerning the use by Agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration, 
without a warrant, of a telescope to observe individuals in an apartment). 
185 [d. at 139. 
1"6Id. 
187 [d. 
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court remanded the case for a determination of whether the en-
hanced observations formed the basis of the warrant. 188 
The Supreme Court did not decide that the photography in the 
Dow case was intrusive enough to violate the prohibition against 
enhanced surveillance. 189 The Court held these photographs to be a 
mere enhancement of vision. 190 However, the district court was im-
pressed with the aerial photographs' detail and clarity, and noted 
their capacity for enlargement without distortion. 191 If the Supreme 
Court held that such sophisticated photography is a mere enhance-
ment of vision,192 the question becomes at what point will an en-
hanced perception become a fourth amendment violation. 193 Although 
there is no expectation of privacy in the open areas of a large factory, 
at some point a type of photography must become so intrusive that 
it invades areas where such an expectation does exist. However, 
because the plant is designated an open field the courts will not 
evaluate whether the enhancement violates privacy interests. 194 
D. Availability of Acquired Information to Competitors 
A fourth variable of aerial surveillance deals with the ability of 
competitors to obtain information gained through the surveillance. 
In its brief, the Dow Chemical Company argued that the EPA's use 
of aerial photography undercut the Clean Air Act's protection of 
trade secrets. 195 The Court discounted this argument by holding that 
188 Id. at 141. 
189 Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1827 (1986). 
190Id. 
191 Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1357 (E.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd, 749 
F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986). 
192 Dow Chem. Co., 106 S. Ct. at 1827 ("The mere fact that human vision is enhanced 
somewhat, at least to the degree here, does not give rise to constitutional problems."). 
193 Dow Chem. Co., 536 F. Supp. at 1368. "While the EPA did not engage in any 'Star Wars' 
surveillance, and only used equipment which was commercially available, if this warrantless 
investigatory method is countenanced in this case, where will courts draw the line?" Id. 
194 See generally Dow Chem. Co., 106 S. Ct. 1819. 
195 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 13, at 47. Specifically, section 114(c) of the Clean Air Act 
will be compromised. This section reads, in part 
(c) Availability of records, reports, and information to public; disclosure of trade 
secrets. Any records, reports or information obtained under subsection (a) shall be 
available to the public, except that upon a showing satisfactory to the Administrator 
by any person that records, reports, or information, or particular parts thereof (other 
than emission data) to which the Administrator has access under this section if made 
public, would divulge methods or processes entitled to protection as trade secrets 
42 U.S.C. § 7414(c). 
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the United States government, through the EPA, was not acting to 
appropriate trade secrets. 196 Rather, the EPA was trying to regulate 
Dow. 197 Thus, the Court did not find compelling Dow's concerns over 
trade secret infringement. 198 The Court, however, declined to con-
sider that a competitor conceivably could appropriate aerial surveil-
lance photographs containing trade secrets through the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA).199 
FOIA took effect in July of 1967.200 Prior to this, a provision in 
the Administrative Procedure Act governed an agency's ability to 
withhold or release information. 201 This provision, however, was 
somewhat vague202 and discretionary in nature. 203 This vagueness 
led agencies to discover loopholes which led to situations where 
agencies denied information to the public, even in cases of legitimate 
requests. 204 FOIA's primary purpose, then, was to increase public 
access to government records. 205 This was accomplished by manda-
tory disclosure upon request and substituting, in the place of discre-
tionary standards, limited categories of material that need not be 
disclosed.206 
19" Dow Chern. Co., 106 S. Ct. at 1823. 
mId. 
1"" Id. 
199 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
200 American Mail Line Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696,699 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (ordering disclosure 
of Maritime Subsidy Board memorandum). 
201 5 U.S.C. § 1002(c) (1958). The Act read in part, "Save as otherwise required by statute, 
matters of official record shall in accordance with published rule be made available to persons 
properly and directly concerned except information held confidential for good cause found." 
Id. 
202 American Mail Line, 411 F.2d at 699. 
203 Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding it within the Administrative 
Procedure Act and Freedom of Information Act's scope to mandate the release of document 
requested). 
204 Bristol-Myers Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1970) cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970) (Federal Trade Commission required to disclose documents to 
Bristol-Myers if on remand they are held not to fall within the exception for investigatory 
files). 
205 Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1076. American Mail Line, 411 F.2d at 699 ("[Pjremier purpose of 
the Act was to elucidate the availability of government records and actions to the American 
citizen."); Sterling Drug Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 450 F.2d 698, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1971) 
(FOIA's purpose was to increase citizen's access to records). 
206 Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1076. 
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One of these exceptions in FOIA concerns the disclosure of "trade 
secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a per-
son. "207 The purpose of the exception is twofold. 208 First, it attempts 
to encourage businesses to cooperate in delivering information to 
the government upon request.209 Congress hoped that once busi-
nesses are assured that information will be kept confidential they 
will cooperate more freely with the government. 210 Secondly, this 
provision attempts to protect those who submit confidential data to 
agencies from competitors gaining such information. 211 Initially, 
FOIA contained no exemptions for trade secrets.212 However, sub-
committee hearings identified the potential for exploitation by com-
petitors if they acquired information from an agency.213 To these 
ends, the Act attempts to treat confidentially information which the 
government receives but which the providing company would not 
themselves disclose to competitors. 214 
Courts have narrowly interpreted the trade secrets exemption to 
disclosure. 215 It has been interpreted in this way to provide the public 
207 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). This section reads, "This section does not apply to matters that are 
... (4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and 
privileged or confidential .... " [d.; see also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757(b) (1939). The 
Restatement of Torts defines a trade secret as: 
[Alny formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's 
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors 
who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process 
of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other 
device, or a list of customers .... A trade secret is a process or device for continuous 
use in the operation of the business. 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757(b). For the purposes of Freedom of Information Act 
§ 552(b)(4), at least one court has narrowly interpreted trade secrets as a "secret, commercially 
valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is used for the making, preparing, compounding, 
or processing of trade commodities and that can be said to be the end product of either 
innovation or substantial effort." Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 
1280, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
208 National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
209 Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("This exemption is intended to 
encourage individuals to provide certain kinds of confidential information to the Government 
.... "); see also National Parks, 498 F.2d at 769 (holding that the exemption is to encourage 
cooperation with the government by those who are not obligated to do so). 
210 National Parks, 498 F.2d at 767. 
211 [d. at 768 (The Freedom of Information Act in § 552(b)(4) "protects persons who submit 
financial or commercial data to government agencies from the competitive disadvantages which 
would result from its publication"). 
212 [d. 
213 [d. 
214 Sterling Drug Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 450 F.2d 698, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Petkas 
v. Staats, 501 F.2d 887, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
215 Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see also Black Hills Alliance v. 
United States Forest Service, 603 F. Supp. 117, 118 (D. S.D. 1984). 
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with maximum access to government information. 216 To merit trade 
secrets protection, the provider has to want the information to be 
kept confidential. 217 This, however, is not the only factor a court will 
look to in determining confidentiality.218 Rather, courts investigate 
two other aspects. These factors are: whether the disclosure is likely 
to impair the government's ability to obtain information in the fu-
ture, and whether the disclosure is likely to cause substantial harm 
to the competitive position of the submitter.219 For the first factor, 
one of the primary criteria courts consider is whether the initial 
disclosure of the information to the government was mandatory. 220 
Courts have held that if the government requires the information to 
be submitted, the government's ability to obtain it cannot be im-
paired. 221 Disclosure will thus be permitted because it will not impair 
the government's ability to obtain the information in the future. 222 
As for the satisfaction of the second factor, whether disclosure would 
cause substantial competitive harm to the submitter, it is not nec-
essary for the submitter to show actual competitive harm.223 The 
submitter of the information in question must only show actual com-
petition and a likelihood of substantial competitive injury.224 Finally, 
the exemptions in FOIA are not mandatory bars to disclosure. 225 
Thus, FOIA does not limit an agency's discretion to disclose infor-
mation even if the information falls under the trade secrets exemp-
tion. 226 
The EPA uses two methods to determine if an item falls within 
these exceptions. 227 First, the business may assert a business confi-
dentiality claim if it wants the information kept confidential within 
the Agency.228 This claim is normally made at the time the business 
216 Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974). 
217 General Servo Admin. v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1980). 
218 National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
219Id. at 770; see also Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1290 
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Washington Post Co. v. United States Dept. of Health, 690 F.2d 252, 268 
(D.C. Cir. 1982), remanded and rev'd on other grounds, 795 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
220 Washington Post, 690 F.2d at 268. 
221Id. 
222Id. 
223 Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. v. United States, 615 F.2d 527,530 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Public 
Citizen Health Research Group, 704 F.2d at 1291. 
224 Gulf & Western, 615 F.2d at 530. 
225 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1978) ("We simply hold here that Congress 
did not design the FOIA exemption to be mandatory bars to disclosure."). 
226 Id. at 294 ( "We therefore conclude that Congress did not limit an agency's discretion to 
disclose information when it enacted the FOIA."). 
227 EPA Public Information, 40 C.F.R. § § 2.203-4 (1987). 
228 40 C.F.R. § 2.203(b). This section reads 
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submits the information to the EPA.229 The EPA's legal office then 
determines whether to honor this claim. 230 Under the second method, 
the EPA may contact the responsible person at the business to learn 
whether the business would like to assert a business confidentiality 
claim. 231 EPA's legal office always makes the determination on a 
business confidentiality claim, regardless of the claim's origin. 232 
Businesses are not allowed to obtain trade secrets through the use 
of aerial surveillance. 233 In E.!. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Chris-
topher,234 an unknown third party hired the defendants to take aerial 
photographs of a duPont plant in Texas. 235 The duPont company 
Method and time of submitting business confidentiality claim. A business which 
is submitting information to EPA may assert a business confidentiality claim covering 
the information by placing on (or attaching to) the information, at the time it is 
submitted to the EPA, a cover sheet, stamped or typed legend, or other suitable 
form of notice employing language such as "trade secret," "proprietary," or "company 
confidential." Allegedly confidential portions of otherwise non-confidential documents 
should be clearly identified by the business, and may be submitted separately to 
facilitate identification and handling by EPA. If the business desires confidential 
treatment only until a certain date or until the occurrence of a certain event, the 
notice should so state. 
Id. 
229Id. 
23°Id. § 2.205(a)(I). This section provides 
Id. 
Role of the EPA legal office. (1) The appropriate EPA legal office ... is responsible 
for making the final administrative determination of whether or not business infor-
mation covered by a business confidentiality claim is entitled to confidential treatment 
under this subpart. 
231 Id. § 2.204(c)(2)(i). This section provides 
Id. 
If the examination conducted under paragraph (c)(1) of this section [determining 
that there has not been a previous determination of confidential treatment by a 
federal court or the EPA) discloses the existence of any business which, although it 
has not asserted a claim, might be expected to assert a claim if it knew the EPA 
proposed to disclose the information, the EPA office shall contact a responsible official 
of each such business to learn whether the business asserts a claim covering the 
information. 
232 I d. § 2.205(a)(l) (EPA legal office responsible for final confidentiality determination). 
The EPA legal office uses several criteria in its determination: (1) whether the business has 
asserted a business confidentiality claim; (2) whether the business has taken reasonable 
measures to protect the confidentiality of the information; (3) whether the information is 
reasonably obtainable without the business' consent; (4) whether any statute specifically 
requires disclosure of the information; and (5) if disclosure would cause substantial harm to a 
business' competitive position or would impair the Government's ability to obtain necessary 
information in the future. Id. § 2.208. 
233 E.!. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1014 (5th Cir. 1970), eert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971), reh'g denied, 401 U.S. 967 (1971); see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. 
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1973). 
234 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970). 
235 Id. at 1013. 
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claimed that the photos revealed a secret methanol producing pro-
cess. 236 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled for duPont, 
relying on the Restatement of Torts' trade secrets section that Texas 
had adopted. 237 This section states that one cannot disclose or use 
another's trade secrets if they were discovered by "improper 
means. "238 The court held that aerial surveillance was an improper 
means of acquiring trade secret information. 239 The court stated that 
commercial privacy must be protected from acts that cannot be 
reasonably anticipated. 240 The court then concluded that any type of 
aerial photography is an unacceptable method of discovering trade 
secrets.241 A competing company, then, cannot legally use this 
method of surveillance against a manufacturer to acquire trade se-
cret information. 
A competing company, however, may legally acquire trade secrets 
about a company like Dow by acquiring aerial photographs taken by 
the EPA under FOIA.242 With the use of aerial surveillance in an 
investigation, the protection the EPA employs for acquired infor-
mation may not be successful. 243 For example, a business that is 
being aerially surveyed cannot submit a traditional business confi-
dentiality claim for it may have no idea that there has been an 
investigation. 244 By the time a business learns of the surveillance 
and submits a claim, the information could already have been dis-
seminated under EPA regulations. 245 These regulations state that if 
the EPA receives a claim after it gathers the information the Agency 
2:)6Id. 
~17 Id. at 1014. 
2:" Id. 
2:19 Id. at 1015. 
240 Id. at 1016 ("Commercial privacy must be protected from espionage which could not have 
been reasonably anticipated or prevented."). 
241 Id. at 1017 ("Aerial photography, from whatever altitude, is an improper method of 
discovering trade secrets .... "). 
242 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 13, at 47. The brief argues that "the Agency's use of aerial 
photography abrogates any possible trade secret protection since the person photographed 




245 40 C.F.R. § 2.203(c) (1987). This section reads in part 
Id. 
If a claim covering the information is received after the information itself is received, 
EPA will make such efforts as are administratively practicable to associate the late 
claim with copies of the previously submitted information with the EPA files .... 
However, EPA cannot assure that SUCl. efforts will be effective in light of the 
possibility of prior disclosure or widespread prior dissemination of the information. 
622 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 15:593 
can only attempt to stop any dissemination that has already begun. 246 
The EPA cannot, however, guarantee that the information will be 
withheld. 247 Further, submission of a business confidentiality claim 
is one of the criteria the EPA uses in its discretionary decision to 
withhold the information. 248 The lack of submission of the claim would 
seem to weigh towards a disclosure decision. 
The problem lies in the lack of protection for businesses like Dow. 
With normal investigations there is the protection of a review of 
whether something is a trade secret if the information's confiden-
tiality is challenged. 249 With aerial surveillance, however, if a com-
pany has no opportunity to submit a timely claim, a competitor could 
acquire the photographs taken. This would allow a competitor to 
mitigate the protection the trade secrets exemption otherwise would 
provide. 
IV. THE POST-SURVEILLANCE NOTICE REQUIREMENT 
In judging fourth amendment questions, courts have used the 
approaches of the Katz test 250 and the open fields test 251 to deter-
mine the need for a warrant to conduct a search. The Dow decision 
approached the problem using the open fields test. 252 This approach 
permits aerial surveillance if a factory is deemed an open field. Such 
reasoning does not take into account the many factors of aerial 
surveillance that a Katz analysis entails. The Dow decision denies a 
business the fourth amendment protection the Katz analysis pro-
vides. This Comment does not argue for a reversal of that decision. 
Rather, this Comment posits that the failure to conduct a Katz 
evaluation denies the weighing of the variables that aerial surveil-
lance presents. 253 An observed business is denied the protections the 
246 Id. 
247 Id. 
248 [d. § 2.208 (for a determination of confidentiality the EPA legal office considers the 
submission of a business confidentiality claim). 
249 See generally Orion Research Inc. v. EPA, 615 F.2d 551 (1st Cir. 1980) (judicial review 
of whether contract bids submitted to EPA contained confidential trade secrets); Black Hills 
Alliance v. United States Forest Service, 603 F. Supp. 117 (D.S.D. 1984) (judicial review of 
whether uranium drilling information is a confidential trade secret). 
250 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
251 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). 
252 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1825 (1986). 
25a See supra notes 139-249 and accompanying text. 
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Katz analysis affords, yet remains exposed to the vagaries of EPA 
surveillance. Admittedly, courts may not tolerate abuse of the var-
iables of height, duration, and enhancement of the surveillance sim-
ply due to an open fields designation and they may intervene in such 
situations. Such judicial intervention, however, is up to the discre-
tion of a court and the observed party remains unprotected. 
This vulnerability is particularly acute for corporations whose 
trade secrets could become available to a competitor after aerial 
surveillance. This Comment calls for a post-surveillance notice re-
quirement to solve the problems that such exposure presents. Notice 
that property had been aerially surveyed by the EPA would protect 
an observed business from competitors acquiring its trade secrets 
from the EPA through FOIA. Protection of trade secrets concerns 
the EPA because the Clean Air Act,254 as well as a number of other 
environmental statutes,255 provide for such protection. It would seem 
in keeping with EPA policy to provide a business with further pro-
tection against trade secret infringement256 if current EPA regula-
tions do not. Such is the case with aerial surveillance. 257 
This Comment advocates that the EPA post-surveillance notifi-
cation should come within twenty-four hours of the completion of 
the surveillance. This EPA notice should detail what the EPA ob-
served, the nature of the equipment the EPA used in the observa-
tion, and the duration of the observation. Failure to provide such 
notification should be actionable by the observed party in federal 
courts. Such notice would solve the problem of timely submission of 
the business confidentiality claim. 258 Without such notice, a corpo-
ration has no opportunity to submit a business confidentiality claim 
because it does not know that it has been observed. By informing 
254 See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
255 See generally Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-4(d) (1982); Deepwater Ports 
Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. § 1513(b) (1982); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1318(b) (1982); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2613(c) (1982); Noise Control Act 
of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4912(b) (1982). 
~'6 See supra notes 227-32 and accompanying text. 
257 Information acquired through aerial surveillance might not be kept confidential because 
its disclosure may not impair the ability of the government to acquire the information in the 
future. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
Release of such information, however, may cause competitive harm. This seems to be enough 
to satisfy the confidentiality question, as information desired to be withheld need not satisfy 
both prongs of the confidentiality test. I d. (kept confidential if disclosure is "(1) likely to impair 
the Government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause sub-
stantial harm to the competitive position" (emphasis added». 
25" 40 C.F.R. § 2.203(c) (1987). 
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the business that the EPA has conducted aerial surveillance and 
what it has observed, that business will be able to decide if it desires 
to submit a business confidentiality claim.259 Such submission would 
alert the EPA to the fact that it has photographed a trade secret, a 
fact of which it may not have been aware. Further, the filing of such 
a claim in one search would alert the EPA to contact a business after 
a subsequent search if no business confidentiality claim has been 
filed. 260 In this way, the aims of the EPA's and FOIA's protection of 
trade secrets would be maintained. 
V. CONCLUSION 
With the Supreme Court's decision in Dow Chemical Co. v. United 
States,261 aerial surveillance is now a tool that the EPA can use to 
enforce environmental regulations. Under Dow, the EPA can mon-
itor or observe a business without the business being aware of the 
observation. 
The Supreme Court's failure to consider the variables that are 
inherent in this surveillance method, however, leaves the observed 
underprotected from EPA abuse. Such abuse could lead to a violation 
of a business' legitimate right to privacy that could go unchallenged 
due to the open fields exception. Further, the EPA's use of this 
surveillance may enable a competitor of the observed business to 
acquire trade secrets through FOIA.262 
This Comment suggests that the EPA should be required to sub-
mit to the observed post-surveillance notification. This requirement 
would allow the conflicting concepts of efficient enforcement of en-
vironmental regulations and the protection of the fourth amendment 
rights of the observed to co-exist. Requiring notice after the act of 
surveillance does not compromise the efficiency of the investigation. 
The business will not be able to hide a problem from detection 
because the surveillance would be carried out without prior notice. 
However, protection of a business' trade secrets would still be intact 
because EPA's post-surveillance notice would give them some idea 
of how they were observed. The post-surveillance notice require-
ment would allow businesses to inform the EPA that a trade secret 
may have been photographed and request cooperation from the EPA 
in not disseminating the information. 
259Id. § 2.203(b). 
26°Id. § 2.204(c)(2)(i). 
261 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986). 
262 See supra notes 195-249 and accompanying text. 
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The DOW63 decision demonstrates the advancements that have 
been made in environmental enforcement. Along with these advance-
ments, protection must still be accorded the individual. We cannot 
abrogate the doctrine of open fields, but we can modify the investi-
gations that use the advantages the doctrine presents. With a post-
surveillance notice requirement, neither the efficiency of the sur-
veillance nor the needs of the observed are compromised. 
263 106 S. Ct. 1819. 
